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Abstract  
This paper offers a transatlantic comparison of shale politics.  Both the US and European Union 
(EU) have ample shale beds; both are high consumption democracies thirsty for plentiful, stable, 
cheaper sources  of energy. Yet exploitation of shale in the US has proceeded at fever pitch, while 
in the EU development has been hesitant if not stagnant. Structural explanations – geological, 
geographic, economic, technological - are key to understanding this difference, but so too is the 
role of agency – who are the actors shaping policy and how do they seek to influence public 
debate and government agendas?  This study, while mindful of structural conditions, applies 
insights from network and framing analysis to highlight the set of actors, interests and frames 
that shape shale’s variable development in the US and Europe. Drawing on an in-depth, 
systematic analysis of news reports, websites and interviews from 2013-2015, it demonstrates 
how differences in shale policy are explained not just by geology, economic or other structural  
factors, but also by the role of competing pro- and anti-shale networks, and the framing 
strategies they enjoy.  In short, it argues that the interaction of structure and agency best explains 
transatlantic differences. 
 
Key words: shale, fracking, framing, US, European Union 
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Introduction 
The exploitation of shale gas is one of the more significant innovations in global energy extraction 
this century. According to International Energy Administration estimates, global shale gas supply 
could grow by more than 50 percent by 2035.1 Shale exploitation promises potentially huge 
benefits: plentiful and cheap supplies of natural gas, reduced dependence on foreign imports, 
local economic renovation, and the creation of thousands of jobs. But extraction of shale, most 
notably through hydraulic fracturing or ‘fracking’, is controversial. Particular concerns include 
water pollution, methane leakage, triggering of earthquakes, and an adverse impact on 
landscapes, health and  communities.  
 
While the benefits and risks of fracking are broadly similar across the globe, the process has 
developed in dramatically different ways. A particularly notable comparison is that between the 
US and the European Union (EU). Of course both the US and Europe feature considerable internal 
variation in the development of fracking.2 Within the EU, that diversity is reflected not just in 
member states’ varying enthusiasm for shale, but also in an uneven reliance on external energy 
sources.3 This study acknowledges that diversity; it draws on evidence from member states with 
varied positions, while focusing, where possible, on an ‘EU position’ on shale.  It also draws on 
other scholars who offer additional analysis of that diversity through a rich array of single state 
or country case studies on shale.4   
 
This study’s main aim, however, is to explain the broad transatlantic differences between two 
political systems which represent quite different levels of, and approaches to, shale 
development.5  Both the US and EU have ample shale beds, both are high consumption 
democracies thirsty for plentiful, stable, cheaper sources  of energy. But in the US, shale 
extraction has proceeded at fever pitch, spurred on by favourable policies, supportive elites, and 
a permissive public.6 A decade ago shale gas was an insignificant source of energy: today it 
comprises over a third of America’s total gas supply.7 In Europe shale reserves are also massive. 
Poland, France, the UK and Romania all feature significant shale gas basins. Yet the exploitation 
of shale gas within the EU has been slow, hesitant and ambivalent.  Public support as a whole is 
low,8 and policy initiatives stymied.  No shale play is yet to produce gas.  In short, both  in terms 
of  policy and public acceptance, US shale extraction is much more developed than in the EU.  
 
Most literature has focused primarily on structural explanations for this transatlantic variance. 
These include geology (shale is more plentiful and easier to access in the US), geography (Europe 
is more densely populated), and technology (drilling innovations emerged and are more 
advanced in the US).9 Furthermore, different regulatory structures - rules, directives, laws – 
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matter. Broadly speaking US legislation on environment, chemicals and safety are more 
favourable to shale development.10 Meanwhile, economists have highlighted the role of 
economic conditions – including the level of market liberalisation, tax credits and land ownership 
– as more or less conducive to the extraction of shale gas.11  However powerful these structural 
factors, they alone provide an incomplete picture of transatlantic variation and its causes. States 
that are equally geologically rich do not follow the same patterns. States with access to similar 
technology or markets, or governed by similar laws, do not necessarily adopt similar policies or 
stances towards fracking. Structural explanations tend to neglect the role of agency: which actors 
(political, economic, public) are most active? What sort of networks do they form to promote or 
oppose shale exploitation? Why and how do these pro- and anti-networks present or ‘frame’ 
issues in a particular way? 12 This article draws on network and framing analysis to answer these 
questions. It argues differences in shale exploitation in the US and EU are indeed shaped by 
geology, technology or economics, but are also explained by the  characteristics  of the pro- and 
anti-shale networks, and the framing strategies they employ.  In short – it shows how structural 
and human factors interact to shape the varied development of shale policy. 
 
After introducing the framework and methodology (Section 2), this article examines opposing 
networks and the framing strategies they employ in the US (Section 3) and European Union 
(Section 4). Section 5 analyses the differences – it shows how the composition and character of 
opposing networks (membership, resources and ‘reach’) have led to a far more cautious 
European approach, amplifying structural constraints and limiting significantly the development 
of shale gas extraction in the EU.  
 
Framework and Methodology 
Policy network analysis – which focuses broadly on the role of actors and interaction between 
them - is a useful approach for this study’s focus on agency. Policy networks include an 
identifiable and policy-concerned set of public and private actors who come together to shape 
policy.13 In the area of shale, opposing networks have emerged on either side of the shale issue, 
pushing for shale or protesting and seeking to halt its development. Both the pro and anti shale 
networks include actors from government institutions, interest groups, experts and civil society 
who work together to advocate policy positions, mobilize the public and policymakers, and shape 
the policy agenda. They are held together by an informal exchange of resources such as funding, 
expertise, access, or legitimacy.  Industry brings funding and knowledge; NGOs and experts can 
offer legitimacy in exchange for access, while government actors need the expertise, support, 
and legitimacy of a range of groups. Shale networks can include actors who do not necessarily 
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share common beliefs on, say, the desirability of energy efficiency, the role of government, the 
severity of climate change or its causes, and they are not seeking to realise a particular belief 
system. They are instead held together by a desire to shape policy, and the exchange of resources 
needed to achieve that aim.  
 
Both pro- and anti-networks seek to shape the government and public policy agenda by 
advocating particular positions, and convincing the public and policymakers of their merit. How 
those ideas are framed and presented is crucial to that success. To capture these dynamics this 
study supplements network literature with insights from framing analysis, which emphasizes how 
problems are defined, argued and debated.  Framing refers to how actors select and accentuate 
particular aspects of an issue according to an overarching shared narrative and message.14 
Frames combine empirical information and emotive appeals. They are often connected to core 
political values (such as economic growth or security), and are communicated to the public simply 
and directly. They can be used to draw attention to a problem, but also to deflect attention away 
from an issue.15 In short, political actors frame issues to increase or decrease attention to them, 
mobilize actors, and direct policymakers towards solutions. Whose definition or frame takes hold 
is important because it shapes how an issue is handled.16   
 
This study constructs an overview of competing networks and frames by examining 
systematically a series of news stories, statements, policies, and websites of key network 
members. I first identified the main actors and issues of contestation through a review of 
secondary literature supplemented with a preliminary examination of news stories from major 
(English language) news sources in the US and Europe .17 This preliminary examination was used 
to identify the actors and coalitions featured in Table 1. Having identified key players and their 
coalitions I then focused on the main websites and press quotes of key actors in both coalitions:  
industry federations, government officials, environmental NGOs and community groups.  Using 
the Nexis® database I collected and analysed the content of, and quotations from, 50 news stories 
from 2013-15, as well as 15 actors’ websites to identify the key discursive frames communicated 
by each coalition. I manually coded the data (websites and quotes in news stories) to identify the 
key words and phrases associated with these core frames. For example an ‘economic growth’ 
frame included the key words of jobs or prosperity; the environmental risk frame included 
references to water contamination, industrialisation and destruction. Tables 2 and 3 below show 
the key frames identified and their relative salience.  Finally, semi-structured in-depth interviews 
(N=5) with key actors in various coalitions were conducted for background information and to 
gain a deeper understanding of the frames and their use.   
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Table 1:  Pro- and Anti-Fracking Networks in the US and EU 
 
US Networks Primary 
member types 
 
Member  
examples  
Key resources 
exchanged 
Frames 
 
Pro-fracking 
Oil & gas firms 
Service 
industries; 
Govt supporters; 
Landowners 
 
API; APPI 
Business 
Roundtable  
State 
governors; 
MSC 
Financial and 
tech support; 
Govt access &  
influence; 
Legitimacy 
Land 
Economic growth; 
Security; 
Reassurance/Tech 
prowess; 
Clean energy 
 
 
Anti-fracking 
Local residents; 
Environmental &  
health NGOs and 
coalitions;  
Celebrities 
AAF, FoE; Food 
& Water 
Watch; Josh 
Fox;  
Local support 
and knowledge; 
Scientific data; 
publicity and 
media exposure 
Risk; 
David v Goliath; 
Fossil fuel ‘lock-in’  
 
EU  
Networks  
    
 
Pro-fracking 
Oil & gas firms 
Service 
industries;  
Govt supporters; 
 
Shale Gas 
Europe 
Chevron; 
ERT; IOWG 
UK and Polish 
govt; 
DG Energy 
Financial 
support; 
expertise; 
experience; 
legislative 
access 
Economic growth; 
Security; 
Reassurance; 
Clean energy 
(bridge) 
 
Anti-fracking 
Local residents 
and groups; 
farmers; environ-
mental and  
health NGOs; 
National and EP 
parties; national 
officials;  
Renewables firms 
FracAttack 
French 
politicians; 
Members of 
the European 
Parliament; DG 
Environment 
widespread 
local support; 
strategic and 
tactical advice;  
entry to 
national &  
supra-national 
parliaments and 
govts 
Risk; 
David v Goliath; 
Fossil fuel ‘lock- in’ 
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Fracking in the US 
Exploitation of shale gas through fracking is not new, but it has experienced an astonishing revival 
in the US, with yields jumping from less than one percent in the late 1990s, to 20 percent of 
domestic gas production by 2010.18 The increase in gas production is so great that liquefied 
natural gas (LNG) import terminals in the US are being re-vamped to export the gas. The 
geographic, technological and economic structural factors mentioned above provide a conducive 
environment for such development, but we still need to know which actors exploited or thwarted 
such structural conditions, and how. Below I identify the competing networks and frames they 
employ to either promote or halt shale developments.19 I show how the US pro-shale network’s 
composition and framing strategy has strengthened the pro-shale message, even if opposition is 
clearly present.  
 
US Pro-Fracking Network: Members, Resources, Frames 
Some of the most active members of the pro-fracking network represent various energy and 
associated industries. Obvious proponents are the oil and gas companies who have the largest 
economic stake in fracking operations and are professionally well represented by organisations 
such as the American Petroleum Institute (API), the Independent Petroleum Association of 
American (IPAA), or America’s Natural Gas Alliance (ANGA). Also involved in the network are 
associated ‘downstream’ service companies, especially those providing supporting 
infrastructure, including transmission pipelines, gas processing or storage capacity. These 
economic actors often join together in coalitions linked to different shale basins. One of the 
largest is the Marcellus Shale Coalition (MSC)20 which represents dozens of large oil and gas firms 
but also many associated drilling, haulage, transport and chemical industries. These economic 
interests bring enormous resources, not just financial, but also expertise and information on the 
positive impacts of ‘responsible natural gas production’.21  
 
Federal but especially state governments can benefit mightily from shale development. 
Policymakers can boast a record of job creation for their state, district or locality, and benefit 
from generous windfall taxes or royalties from businesses. In exchange, the gas industry benefits 
from a range of state tax credits and R&D subsides that help to make development economically 
more lucrative, and keep shale development high on governments’ policy agenda. Although some 
fracking champions operate in Congress (a natural gas caucus exists in both houses), most are 
active at the state level.  State level policymakers have responded to industry’s desire for 
advantageous state legislation, or favourable implementation of federal rules. For example, Rabe 
and Borick underline the role of Pennsylvania’s entrepreneurial former governor Tom Corbett 
who championed shale gas, and minimized governmental interference.22  Similarly, Davis’ study 
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of fracking in Colorado uncovers the tight relationship between industry representatives and 
state legislators.23 The US networks feature a less prominent role for local or community 
representatives even though their governing remit is deeply affected by fracking operations.24   
 
Landowners in the US have a significant resource to exchange: the lease of their land and local 
support. In the US mineral rights normally belong to landowners rather than the state. The 
majority of wells drilled are on private land. Consent is easier to obtain if landowners feel they 
will benefit personally, and often generously, for operations on their property. When the 
economic incentive to allow exploration and extraction is accepted, the benefitting landowners 
become participants in the pro-fracking network by acting as advocates for the policy generally, 
or at least not advocating its restraint. These landowners are a key network member missing 
from Europe. 
 
Finally energy experts bring to the network expertise but also much sought after credibility. While 
some are accused of acting merely as fronts for industry bodies,25 less controversial experts are 
also involved, such as energy institute fellows, editorial writers, or academics. These members’ 
promotion of fracking is qualified but still robust. Shale is viewed, on balance, as the most 
reasonable way out of the energy crisis, provided it’s part of a ‘reasonable energy mix’.26   
 
Frames  
The relative salience of pro-shale frames is depicted in Table 2. Of the top four pro-fracking 
frames identified, the most dominant is that of economic growth brought about by a cheap, 
secure energy supply. In the US economic benefits are often pitched at individuals: lower energy 
prices, more jobs, and the promise of continued economic opportunity. Expressing this frame 
well is the trade body American Petroleum Institute, whose spokesman promises the ‘creation 
of hundreds of thousands of new jobs…billions of additional dollars in revenues for government, 
[and] lower household energy bills’.27 This frame also depicts regulation as a threat to economic 
growth. In their news releases the API warned that the job creation brought about by shale 
development could be stymied by ‘unnecessary, duplicative regulations’. 28 Or, representing a 
wider range of major firms, the US Business Roundtable urged the US Environmental Protection 
Agency to base its regulations ‘on sound science’ and ‘take into consideration the net cumulative 
impact these regulations have on energy costs, economic growth and job creation’.29 
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Table 2: Pro-Shale Frames in the US and EU 
 
 
 
Key: figures represent the number of times a frame was invoked by pro-shale network members’ 
websites or (by direct or indirect quotes) in 50 press stories from Jan 2013 to Jan 2015 
 
Closely intertwined with economic growth is a frame encompassing secure energy supply, and 
the resulting energy security, if not independence, for the US. This goal is long standing and 
linked closely to wider concerns of national security.  It gained particular resonance since 2011, 
in the wake of growing uncertainties driven by the instability in the Middle East and Eastern 
Europe.30  This frame is repeatedly invoked by actors such as the Marcellus Shale Coalition which, 
its website states, exists to ‘address issues regarding the production of clean, job-creating 
American natural gas….31 Moreover, shale can strengthen America’s emergence as a ‘global 
energy superpower’ and offers America a ‘once in a life time opportunity to become an energy 
leader’.32 
 
The pro-fracking technological prowess and reassurance frame touts US technological expertise 
and efficiency in shale exploitation. The US Business Roundtable attributes the nation’s 
‘astonishingly’ improved energy outlook to:  
0
5
10
15
20
25
Pro-Shale Frames
US EU
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our development of technologies to unlock vast new domestic oil and natural gas 
resources and the application of innovative technologies to economically extract and 
deliver these resources to market.33 
 
The frame includes a strong reassurance message designed to quell concerns of fracking. Similar 
to the frames used by the pro-nuclear lobby34 it highlights especially the ‘exaggerated fears’ of 
opponents or perceived risks. Industry representatives regularly dismiss concerns of fracking with 
the argument ‘we have been doing this for years and we know what we are doing’.35 An API 
website reminds the public that fracturing is a ‘proven technology used safely for more than 60 
years in more than a million wells.’36  This frame depicts existing regulation as sufficient and 
warns against overreactions. As noted by the Petroleum Institute spokesman:  ‘We can pursue a 
rational, fact-based national energy policy, or we can let misinformation and extreme ideologies 
guide our energy future’.37 
 
Finally, though not as dominant in the US as in Europe, the final pro-frame identified is that of 
‘clean energy’:  shale is promoted as ‘clean’ and therefore a step towards a more sustainable 
energy future.38  For instance the MSC reminds the public that: ‘for shale producers…. ‘every day 
is Earth Day’, claiming their ‘commitment to responsibly develop these abundant, clean-burning 
resources has never been stronger.” 39 
 
In sum the US pro-fracking network features a wide membership, including private and public 
actors stretching from local landowners, up to state and national champions.  Each brings to the 
network resources such as local support, knowledge, credibility, expertise and access. The 
members do not necessarily share core beliefs about the environment, energy use or climate,  
but they are bound together by a shared policy goal and core message: shale is worth exploiting. 
That message is conveyed by emphasising the economic and security benefits of fracking, and 
downplaying its perceived risks.  
 
  
US Anti-Fracking Network: Members, Resources and Frames 
Concerted opposition to fracking began to emerge in 2011 as environmental and health concerns 
about the effects of fracking mounted in the US. A disparate network (see Table 1) formed around 
these shared concerns as the debate over fracking became increasingly popularized and heated. 
Most network activity emerged from local citizen groups who highlighted the adverse local 
impact of fracking, especially related to issues of water use and quality.40 Other community 
groups joined because of fracking’s impact on neighbourhoods, including noise pollution, debris 
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and the disruption of landscape.  While these locals bring to the network grassroots support and 
stories, not all local citizens or groups are opposed, especially not those set to gain from fracking 
operations. 
 
Local concerns have to a certain extent also been taken up by larger national environmental 
NGOs or coalitions which form a further node in the protest network. The largest, ‘Americans 
against Fracking’ (AAF), represents several dozen national organizations as well as state-level 
groups.  Other NGOs most heavily involved are Food and Water Watch and Friends of the Earth 
(FoE).  These large national environmental organisations can offer grassroots groups a national 
forum, lobbying and organisational skills. They in turn need the stories and local support of citizen 
groups. But the extent of systematic involvement of national organizations in fracking is less than 
in Europe (see below) and most protest remains local. While many US environmental NGOs are 
actively opposed to fracking, they have not yet prioritized the issue and are not as active as NGOs 
in Europe.41  
 
Compared to the government involvement and investment seen in the pro-fracking network 
described above, the US anti-fracking network features fewer government champions. Very few 
governors or high profile state officials are part of this anti-network. In some state legislatures 
(such as New York) elected officials have worked with groups to introduce anti-fracking 
legislation, but most proponents face a tough time convincing state representatives to oppose 
actively a practice generating direct revenues for the state. At the federal level congressional 
opponents are sparse. For instance, although a fracking bill (FRAC Act) which would strengthen 
regulation was introduced to Congress in 2009, it was defeated, along with similar bills 
subsequently introduced.42 And when in spring 2015 President Obama announced curbs on 
fracking on federal lands he was careful to present himself (and the government) not as 
opponents to fracking but merely as regulators seeking ‘the more appropriate balance between 
public health and safety and allowing for responsible production’.43 The anti-network can thus 
not yet rely on a wide array of government officials. 
 
A distinctive node of  the US protest network are media and entertainment celebrities who bring 
to the network the prized resource of media attention. In the US local campaigns tend to be 
promoted less by legislative sponsors and more by film or media celebrities. A well known 
example is Josh Fox’s controversial documentaries Gaslands and Gaslands II which depict the 
damage fracturing had on a local community. In 2012 Mat Damon’s drama Promised Land again 
highlighted dangers of fracking, albeit in gentler form.44  
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Frames 
This network’s primary frame is that of risk (see Table 3). Members such as AAF have made the 
most of possible risks to water and health, especially at home, or in the community:  ‘Fracking 
threatens the air we breathe, the water we drink, the communities we call home and the climate 
on which we depend’.45 The documentary Gaslands embodied dramatically the environmental 
risk frame by depicting residents living near fracking sites lighting their ‘burning faucets’ for the 
camera; their tap water contained enough leaded methane to make them as flammable as lighter 
fluid. While members from the opposing network have strongly disputed the link between 
methane content and fracking depicted in the film, the connection between fracking and 
environmental danger stuck. Today the depiction of burning faucets remains one of the protest 
networks’ most powerful images.   
 
 
 
Table 3: Anti-Shale Frames in the US and EU 
 
 
Key: figures represent the number of times a frame was invoked by anti-shale network members in their 
websites or (by direct or indirect quotes) in 50 press stories from Jan 2013 to Jan 2015 
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The second frame allows opponents to depict the conflict over shale as one between well-
resourced economic interests versus local citizens.  I call this the David v Goliath frame. The 
frame is often invoked in support of measures for local fracking bans or moratoria where industry 
can substantially outspend opponents. For instance an organiser for a ban in a Texas town 
described the battle ‘more like David and Godzilla then David and Goliath.’46 More generally, 
opponents refer to shale drilling firms or proponents as ‘big business’ exploiting lax regulation 
while local citizens suffer.47 But in the US this frame can be partly countered by locals who serve 
to benefit from fracking operations. The review of news articles revealed that this frame is more 
often invoked by environmental NGOs who accuse oil firms of a campaign of ‘intimidation and 
obfuscation’ seeking to shape the agenda with an ‘impressive propaganda effort carried by slick 
PR firms’.48  
 
The final, less prominent, anti-shale frame in the US I term ‘fossil fuel lock-in.’ It conveys the 
worry that shale is another fossil fuel that will nudge out investment in renewables and hinder 
the transition to a low carbon economy by ‘locking-in’ damaging fossil fuel dependency. 
Environmental NGOs refer to it most often, though its core message is well expressed by a 
professor of engineering at Cornell who described fracking not as a bridge but ‘a gangplank to 
more warming and away from clean energy investments.’49  According to our study, however, 
the frame was not often invoked by other members. 
 
In sum the US anti-fracking network is broad and varied but somewhat lopsided; it is populated 
primarily by disparate local protesters, some environmentalists and celebrities, with a lighter 
presence of elected officials, government representatives, or business. Compared to the pro-
fracking network there appears to be less integration between those protesters intensely 
opposed, and those actors within government and business who share concerns, but not the 
same oppositional zeal. The network is vocal, relying on frames of risk and skewed battles, but it 
remains primarily an external protesting force invoking often fiery frames.   
 
 
Fracking in the EU 
Although Europe as a whole is considerably less active in fracking than is the US, it is not for lack 
of shale. According to the EIA the technically recoverable shale gas reserves are considerable and 
could account for as much as one-tenth of global resources.50 Northwest England alone features 
huge deposits – ‘in the same league’ as in parts of the US.51 Fracking in Europe involves a broadly 
similar set of benefits and costs as found in the US, though structural conditions are less 
14 
 
conducive to fracking operations. Europe’s energy infrastructure is less developed with fewer 
integrated pipelines or transport networks. The regulatory setting is also less welcoming. 
Although there is currently no EU-wide binding regulation on shale (member states decide 
whether to frack or not), the EU did agree a set of non-binding recommendations in 2014. 
Moreover, all states are affected by existing EU water, air and chemical legislation which is itself 
heavily shaped by the precautionary principle.52 How have European actors mobilized in the 
context of these structural conditions, and with what effect?  
 
 
European Pro-Fracking Network: Members, Resources and Frames 
The pro-fracking network in Europe features many of the same players as in the US (see Table 1), 
but with some notable differences. Industry players again play the most prominent role. Global 
oil and gas companies are keen to shape a favourable agenda in Europe as in the US.  
Multinational companies such as Chevron, Exxon or IGas can bring to the network huge financial 
and information resources. The industry coalition ‘Shale Gas Europe’ (SGE) represents these 
global but also European-based firms such as Cuadrilla, the main firm active in the UK.  Like the 
Marcellus Shale Coalition,  SGE aims to nurture a debate that is ‘balanced and informative.’53 
Another well resourced member is the International Oil and Gas Producers Association (IOWG) 
which represents oil and gas and associated firms. But even with the ample resources of these 
industry coalitions, the European network includes far fewer ‘downstream’ actors. Because 
Europe lacks the chain of supporting industries producing, say, equipment for exploration and 
drilling, the European network does not enjoy the same advocacy from associated firms. Nor are 
as many investors on board. Questions of how easily technically recoverable resources of shale 
gas will actually translate into production continues to create ‘serious investor uncertainty’54 and 
limits further the number and type of economic actors in the European pro-shale network.  
 
Government advocates in Europe are found only in some member states, most notably Poland 
and the UK. These advocates tend to be national politicians who can contribute to the network 
crucial government support and enthusiasm for shale’s potential. There are fewer sub-national 
or local government supporters because while disruption is felt locally, benefits are not. (Unlike 
in the US, royalties and revenues from operations accrue primarily to the national level 
governments.) Advocates from national governments have often worked with industry to create 
an environment conducive to fracking. For instance, in exchange for the promise of industry 
investment, the UK government set up an Office of Unconventional Gas and Oil to simplify the 
regulatory process, and in 2013 it proposed a series of measures and tax breaks to attract shale 
gas developers. Similarly Polish government officials have been enthusiastic proponents, 
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negotiating through EU institutions to ensure EU-wide legislation does not unduly limit fracking 
opportunities. But elsewhere - such as in France, the Czech Republic or Bulgaria - national 
government support is lukewarm or lacking entirely.  
 
Amongst EU institutions, support is mixed but overall hesitant. That matters because EU 
institutions shape decision-making surrounding shale.  We certainly do not find the active EU 
institutional ‘cheerleaders’ as found in, say, the area of renewable energy or climate change.55 
The European Commission, which proposes legislation, includes some shale advocates. Those in 
the Commission’s Energy Directorate are most enthusiastic, though they also stress the need for 
caution and vigilance. Meanwhile the Council (where member state views are represented) has 
not yet endorsed fracking but has tried instead to reach consensus amongst the many different 
views represented there.56  
 
Similar to the US pro-network, energy experts and academics can lend this network credibility 
and expertise at both national and EU levels. The Commission has set up a special task force of 
experts to ‘share information between member states and the Commission’ on shale gas.57 
Meanwhile, SGE brings together energy academics and scientists from across the EU to make the 
case for shale. Their selected ‘leading experts in the field’ form an Expert Advisory Panel which 
can advise member companies but also offer reassurance to the public.58 Finally it is important 
to note who is missing from this network: landowners and local officials. These potential ‘local 
champions’ are missing in Europe because, as noted, the revenues from exploitation accrue to 
the state. Representatives from communities most affected do not see any immediate benefits 
and are thus less likely to join the network promoting such developments. 
 
Frames 
Like proponents elsewhere, the European pro-fracking networks presents shale exploitation as a 
way of creating profits, providing jobs and reducing foreign imports.  But, as indicated by Table 
2, the salience of some European pro-shale frames is muted in comparison to the US. The 
message is certainly more cautious, reflecting in part the make-up of the network.   
 
As in the US, the pro-fracking network’s dominant frame is that of economic growth (see Table 
2). Drawing on US experiences, the IOWG underlines shale’s exciting potential to stimulate jobs 
and ‘jump start’ economic growth in Europe.59 Or, as expressed by the UK finance minister:  ‘we 
don’t want British families and businesses to be left behind as gas prices tumble on the other side 
of the Atlantic.’60 But this frame is often tempered with the caveat - more pronounced than in 
the US - of the need to regulate robustly. And whereas the US Business Roundtable fully and 
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enthusiastically endorsed shale as a core part of US energy strategy, the European equivalent 
(European Roundtable) adopts a different emphasis.  It applauds the economic benefits of shale 
as part of an energy strategy but believes Europe needs an energy mix that ‘ensures the transition 
to a low-carbon economy while safe-guarding energy security, quality of supply, and cost to 
industry and society’.61  
 
Security: the desire to free European states from foreign oil, especially Russian gas, creates a 
potentially strong second frame. Although this frame was not originally as prominent as found in 
US, bellicose behaviour by Russia has made this frame increasingly more salient in recent years.62 
Illustrating this frame is SGE’s promise that ‘Abundant sources [of shale] right here in Europe 
promise to consign energy security worries to the past’.63 The Poles are particularly keen to 
embrace shale as a way to reduce European dependence on Russia which, according to a 
government minister, had become ‘absolutely intolerable.’64  This frame is potentially powerful 
and its resonance may increase if the perceived insecurity of Europe’s energy security increases. 
 
The technical prowess and reassurance frame is also present in the EU, but it takes a different 
form. It is not as confident or salient as seen in the US (see Table 2); technological innovation in 
this area is well behind the US. On one hand, assurances from global firms are similar to those 
heard in US. For instance, IOWG stresses to its European audience that ‘shale gas production is 
safe and environmentally-sound, thanks to the constant upgrade of well-known technologies.’65 
However, network actors beyond the oil and gas industry express far more caution, as reflected 
by the EU’s Director-General of Energy: ‘If shale gas can be safely developed in Europe then 
Europeans should not look a gift horse in the mouth’.66  Elsewhere the note of caution is louder, 
as indicated in a statement from the Commission’s Environment Directorate: ‘Ensuring the 
environmental integrity of unconventional hydrocarbons extraction is the Commission's 
overriding concern’.67  Put simply, the European pro-network seeks to reassure by stressing 
precaution (don’t worry - we’ll be careful) rather than expertise (don’t worry - we know what 
we’re doing).  
 
Much more prominent in Europe than in the US is the clean energy or ‘bridge’ frame with its 
carbon-friendly message that shale is good for the climate; it emits far fewer emissions than coal 
and can contribute to a more sustainable energy future. To illustrate, on its website the IOWG 
lists ‘carbon savings’ as the second most important benefit of developing shale in Europe.68 The 
European Commission sponsors conferences explicitly dedicated to ‘shale gas and a low carbon 
Europe’, and SGE regularly and robustly highlights shale’s role in reducing carbon emissions 
elsewhere. (Indeed our comparative news and website analysis shows European proponents 
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make more of this reduction than do US shale proponents, even though no such reduction is 
evident in Europe.) 
 
In sum: compared to its US counterpart the pro-fracking network in Europe is more narrow: there 
are fewer members from the local level, or associated industries, fewer landowners, fewer 
enthusiasts within government institutions, and less interaction amongst its members. In their 
central message the European pro-fracking frames are similar to those in the US – fracking brings 
economic growth and security, and risks can be managed effectively. But overall the emphasis 
on potential environmental benefits is greater, and the positive frames (economic growth and 
technological reassurance) are neither as definitive nor confident as in the US. The growing 
potential of the security frame, and the growing networking activities of Shale Gas Europe may 
strengthen this pro-shale coalition.69  But for now it remains less vocal and less developed than 
its US counterpart. 
 
European Anti-Fracking Network: Members, Resources and Frames 
Fracking operations are not nearly as advanced in Europe as in the US, but the protest networks 
are. Health and especially environmental concerns have prompted the rapid growth of 
community and grassroots groups opposed to the development of shale gas across Europe. Local 
members include local environmental campaigners, but also a much wider range of participants. 
As a typical local protester noted: ‘It's not just people who have been involved in the green 
movement before. We're seeing farmers, landowners, parents, health workers, and church 
groups expressing interest and concern’.70  Unlike in the US these protesters are not offset by 
pro-fracking landowners. Moreover, these groups receive substantial levels of support from 
other network members. For instance, in exchange for local support and stories, these groups 
receive from national NGOs regular advice and workshops (on, say, how to use local planning 
systems to stop fracking operations).71  
 
Like their US counterparts, larger European environmental NGOs share profound concerns about 
fracking’s impact on environment, health and safety. They bring to the network a particular focus 
(and expertise) on certain concerns such as  water, climate and land use. National and European 
NGOs work very closely with local protesters on this issue. For instance, in France mobilization of 
local groups on methane leaks triggered wider campaigns at the local and national level.72  FoE 
Europe was closely involved in local protests in England.  And in the Czech Republic, Bulgaria, 
Romania and Poland, several national NGOs have taken on the local cause by, for instance, calling 
for a national or EU moratorium on exploration and drilling.73 In short, the multi-level interaction 
of protesters is well developed.  
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Another difference between protest networks in the US and the EU is that the latter includes 
close interaction between actors from within and outside of government. In Europe anti-fracking 
networks often garnered substantial levels of support from political parties and parliamentarians 
who can provide direct government access to network members.  For instance, McGowan notes 
how Dutch local groups worked with Dutch Members of Parliament (MPs) to campaign against 
plans for test drillings.74 In 2013 British Green MP Caroline Lucas was arrested alongside 
protesters in an anti-fracking demonstration in England. Similarly, in Germany, local protest was 
embraced by the Green party at the Land level where much of responsibility for regulation rests. 
In France a network of local protesters slowly built momentum drawing in opposition parties, 
first Greens and then the Socialists. Many members of the European Parliament have also played 
a supporting role. While the EP has stopped short of a moratorium on fracking, it has ensured 
the issue received far more robust attention to ensure that ‘provisions for the protection of 
human health and the environment apply across all Member States’.75  
 
Finally, green technology and renewable energy firms have joined the European anti-network, 
motivated by concerns that investment in shale gas will substitute for investment in renewables 
and low carbon technologies. The Aldersgate Group, for instance, a coalition made up of 50 UK 
and European green energy and technology companies and investors, has campaigned with 
NGOs, as have other trade bodies such as the European Wind Energy Association. Their 
involvement broadens the network considerably and renders it more than a protest network.  A 
European Commission official who is lobbied regularly by many interests, including renewables 
firms, noted how these latter actors bring a ‘much wider perspective…..they’re not just 
protesters’.76 
 
Frames 
As illustrated in Table 3, the dominant, overarching ‘anti’ frame in Europe is, like in the US, one 
of risk:  risk to human health, landscape and, especially, climate and the environment:  FoE 
Europe warned: 
Shale gas poses a real and serious threat to the climate, the environment and local 
communities. The extraction of shale gas leads to ground-water contamination, serious 
health impacts, and significantly higher carbon emissions than other fossil fuels.77 
 
Crucially, the frame is not only delivered by environmental NGOs. A European Commission study 
delivered a similar message: 
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Risks of surface and ground water contamination, water resource depletion, air and noise 
emissions, land take, disturbance to biodiversity and impacts related to traffic are 
deemed to be high in the case of cumulative projects.78 
To underscore the message, the frame also includes powerful threat images such as reference to 
‘disastrous’ leaks’ and ‘unsafe’ practices. Members also made frequent use of disaster imagery  
(such as stories of ‘toxic waste floods’ or ‘fracking hell’) to convey the message that both the 
environment and human life are subject to threat.79  
 
The second most noticeable frame in Europe is the David vs Goliath narrative introduced above, 
though in Europe the frame is more prevalent and broader than in the US.  It targets not just 
fracking itself but the process surrounding its regulation and development. The anti network, 
depicts fracking as an assault on local control and a contest between large, often external 
interests (oil and gas firms) versus local groups and ‘ordinary’ citizens.  Representative of this 
frame is are messages delivered by Food & Water Europe who argue the oil and gas industry is 
able to call on ‘well-heeled lobbyists, political campaign war chests and PR specialists’ to 
‘leverage its entrenched position in politics, society and our economy.’80  This frame is attractive 
to local groups across Europe who may not necessarily share environmentalist concerns over 
fracking but do worry about issues of accountability.  An illustration of that breadth is found in 
the widespread protests in Britain in 2013 which featured seasoned environmental protesters 
but also community and village groups and local residents specifically protesting development in 
their particular area and what they viewed as an accompanying lack of transparency and 
control.81 
 
The final powerful frame for European protesters is the climate-focussed, ‘fossil fuel lock-in’ 
frame mentioned above. In Europe the frame is strongly expressed by many actors, including 
renewable firms and environmental NGOs: 
The reality is we do not need to gamble on fracking. Investing in clean…energy from the 
wind, waves and sun – along with a major energy-saving drive – would create hundreds 
of jobs, boost energy security and keep the lights on.82 
The focus on climate effects is greater than that expressed by US opponents. For instance, 
European networks are more likely to highlight the risk of escaped methane, a greenhouse gas 
more potent than C02. Such a frame resonates with a public expressing significant support for 
renewables and environmental sustainability.83 Moreover unlike the US, the EU prides itself as a 
leader on global environmental issues, especially climate change; it is keen to maintain this 
mantle.84 In sum, we can identify in Europe an anti-fracking network with widespread      
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membership, and well integrated exchange of support and resources. Its frames include risk, but 
also a strong emphasis on wider consequences for business, citizens, and the EU’s global role.  
 
 
Concluding Analysis 
Why has shale extraction developed so much more quickly, and intensively, in the US than in 
Europe?  While structural conditions – linked to geology, geography, economics – are key, this 
paper has sought to strengthen those explanations by  highlighting the role of agency and how it 
interacts with those structural conditions. It first identified competing networks of actors seeking 
to shape the fracking agenda, and then explored the frames they employed to further that aim. 
It found that while pro- and anti-networks mobilized in both the US and EU, the resonance of 
their arguments – and thus their possible impact – varied.  In the US, the pro-network have thus 
far enjoyed more ‘success’ (measured by permissive public opinion and policy initiatives) 
whereas in Europe, the anti-network has enjoyed greater support and resonance.  This section 
draws together preliminary explanations for that variance, focusing particularly on the character 
of the network, framing strategies, and how both were shaped by structural conditions. 
 
A network’s character refers to its membership, resource exchange and reach. This study 
suggests that the range of members comprising the network can affect its success. Especially 
important is how and to what extent government policymakers are involved. In the US, 
government representatives are core to the pro-fracking network, but largely missing in the anti-
fracking network. Nor can the latter network rely on the same unified local opposition as  
found in the EU.  Thus while the US anti-network was lively, active and celebrity-studded, it did 
not feature many core members from within government, especially federal government.85  In 
European networks a different dynamic prevailed. While few government actors were core to 
the pro-fracking network, they were key players in anti-fracking networks. This study identified 
active legislators at sub-national, national and supranational levels of governance. Similarly this 
protest network included economic actors (especially those from low carbon industries) on its 
side. It thus spanned a greater variety of key actors able to mobilize beyond a traditional ‘protest’ 
contingent.  
 
Integration and exchange of resources amongst members also affects a network’s success.  For 
instance, even though the US pro-fracking network members did not share core beliefs or 
political values (oil monoliths sat alongside small landowners), all members brought to the 
network key resources (financial clout, government access or local legitimacy) and all were able 
to cohere around a clear, simple message: the benefits of fracking outweigh the costs. By 
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contrast, the pro-fracking Europeans appear to have had, as of yet, fewer opportunities to 
present a unified view.  Instead, the message of global oil firms members (‘do not worry; the risks 
are overstated’) was countered by other network members in favour of further exploration, but 
also deeply cautious. 
 
Linked to membership integration is the network’s multilevel reach. In multilevel systems such 
as the US and EU, successful networks need to mobilize across interests and institutions but also 
across different levels of governance. While networks in both the US and Europe involved some 
multilevel interaction, the European networks, especially the anti-fracking network, featured 
greater multilevel cooperation and interaction. These networks provided a forum necessary for 
local protests to be taken up by actors at the national and even supranational level. In the US, 
that reach is, for now, less developed with fewer links between local, state, and national 
members. 
 
This paper also highlighted the important role of framing strategies. Both sides attempted to 
deliver a clear, simple message linked to the core imperatives of economic growth, 
environmental quality, risk and security. But networks were most successful when they showed 
awareness of – and then exploited - distinctive regulatory, economic or other structural 
conditions in their different polities.  For instance, US proponents of fracking have been more 
successful in delivering the reassurance frame to help maintain a comparatively lax regulatory 
framework. Not only did they prioritise this message, but underlined its credibility by repeated 
reference to the US’ rich experience with drilling and innovative technology. Conversely, with 
their heavy emphasis on fossil-fuel lock-in, the European anti-fracking network successfully 
exploited European citizen’s greater concern with climate change, and the EU’s institutional 
desire to play a global climate role. Also key to strategy was timing.  The US pro-fracking network 
has been initially more successful than its European counterpart because it invoked a powerful 
idea (visible economic gain) at the right time (early on, before environmental concerns mounted). 
In short, ‘success’ depends on structural conditions but also how well coalition members 
exploited them.   
 
In addition to these empirical findings, the study offers several conceptual contributions on which 
future research can build. First, as outlined above, the study can contribute to our conceptual 
understanding of network analysis by outlining how certain network characteristics (membership 
and integration but also multilevel ‘reach’) can shape a network’s ability to achieve its aims. 
Secondly the study contributes to on-going questions about structure and agency and the 
relationship between them. The structural factors (technological, economic, geographic and 
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regulatory) shaping fracking are huge and have rightly received significant recent attention. 
However, few shale studies have focused on the role of actors, and  even fewer have focused on 
both.  This study does not deny the importance of structural conditions: the success or resonance 
of networks and their frames is contingent on the structural conditions in which they are formed 
and delivered. But we need also to examine the strategies and skills of actors, especially their 
ability to frame and mobilize support. In short, the paper suggests how structure and agency 
combine to shape policy agendas. Further such studies are necessary and welcome as a means 
to capture the rapidly changing nature of shale gas politics and governance.  
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